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We give a Shor-Preskill type security-proof to the quan-
tum key distribution without public announcement of bases
[W.Y. Hwang et al., Phys. Lett. A 244, 489 (1998)]. First,
we modify the Lo-Chau protocol once more so that it finally
reduces to the quantum key distribution without public an-
nouncement of bases. Then we show how we can estimate the
error rate in the code bits based on that in the checked bits in
the proposed protocol, that is the central point of the proof.
We discuss the problem of imperfect sources and that of large
deviation in the error rate distributions. We discuss when the
bases sequence must be discarded.
03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Information processing with quantum systems enables
what seems to be impossible with its classical counter-
part [1,2,3,4]. In addition to the practical importance,
this fact has many theoretical and even philosophical im-
plications [5,6].
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [7,8,9,10,11,12] is
one of the most important and interesting quantum infor-
mation processing. QKD will become the first practical
quantum information processor [12]. Although the secu-
rity of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) QKD scheme
[7] had been widely conjectured based on the no-cloning
theorem [13,14], it is quite recently that its unconditional
security was shown [15,16,17]. In particular, Shor and
Preskill [17] showed the security of BB84 scheme, start-
ing from a modified form of the Lo-Chau protocol [18],
by elegantly using the connections among several basic
ideas in quantum information processings, e.g. quantum
error correcting codes (QECCs) [19,20] and entanglement
purification [21].
In the standard BB84 protocol, however, only half of
the data obtained by using expensive quantum commu-
nication can be utilized at most. It is clear that it is not
efficiency but security that is the most important in the
cryptographic tasks. However, it is meaningful enough
to improve the efficiency without loss of security. One
method for the full efficiency QKD is to delay the mea-
surements in the BB84 scheme using quantum memories.
This is indeed the original proposal by Bennett and Bras-
sard [7]. However, the quantum memories would be quite
costly with near-future technology. Another method is to
assign significantly different probabilities to the different
bases [22]. Although unconditional security of the scheme
is given [22], it has a disadvantage that a larger number of
key must be generated at once than in the BB84 scheme
in order to get the same level of security. However, in a
recently proposed QKD without public announcement of
basis (PAB) [23], we can obtain the full efficiency with
such problem relaxed.
The QKD without PAB is a simple variation of BB84
scheme. In the BB84 scheme, Alice and Bob use differ-
ent random bases and then discard the cases where the
bases are not matched. In the QKD without PAB, Alice
and Bob use bases determined by a prior random key, the
basis sequence b. When the basis sequence b is used only
once, it is clear that the scheme is as secure as the BB84
scheme. However, in this case it is obviously meaningless
because they have to consume secret key that is as long
as the generated key. Thus, the problem is that whether
the basis sequence b can be repeatedly used without loss
of security. It was shown that it is the case against the
individual attacks [23] and it was suggested that it could
be against the coherent attacks [24]. The purpose of this
paper is to give the Shor-Preskill type unconditional se-
curity proof to the QKD without PAB. The framework of
the proof is the same as the original one [17]. However, we
modify the Lo-Chau scheme once more to give the QKD
without PAB. We give three schemes: modified Lo-Chau
scheme II that reduces to Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS)
codes scheme II [19,20]. The CSS codes scheme II then
reduces to the QKD without PAB. We argue why we can
estimate the error rate in the code bits based on that in
the checked bits in the protocol, that is the central point
of the proof. This implies that the modified Lo-Chau
scheme II is secure, completing the proof. We discuss
the problem of imperfect sources and that of large de-
viation in the error rate distributions. We discuss when
the bases sequence must be discarded. Then we give a
conclusion.
A. Notation
In this paper, we use mostly the notations in Refs.
[17,25].
The canonical basis of a qubit consists of |0〉 and |1〉.
We define another basis as follows. |0¯〉 = (1/√2)(|0〉+|1〉)
1
and |1¯〉 = (1/√2)(|0〉 − |1〉). The Hadamard transform
H is a single qubit unitary transformation of the form
H = (1/
√
2)(
1 1
1 −1 ) in the canonical basis. This trans-
formation interchanges the bases |0〉, |1〉 and |0¯〉, |1¯〉.
I = σ0 is the identity operator and σx = (
0 1
1 0
), σy =
(
0 −i
i 0
), σz = (
1 0
0 −1 ) are the Pauli operators. The
σa(i) denotes the Pauli operator σa acting on the i-th
qubit where a = 0, x, y, z. For a binary vector s, we let
σ
[r]
a = σ
s1
a(1)σ
s2
a(2) · · ·σsna(n), where si is the i-th bit of s and
σ0a = I, σ
1
a = σa.
The Bell basis states are the four maximally entan-
gled ones, |Ψ±〉 = (1/√2)(|01〉 ± |10〉) and |Φ±〉 =
(1/
√
2)(|00〉 ± |11〉).
Let us consider two classical binary codes, C1 and C2,
such that {0} ⊂ C2 ⊂ C1 ⊂ Fn2 where Fn2 is the binary
vector space of the n bits. A set of basis for the CSS
code can be obtained from vectors v ∈ C1 as follows, v →
(1/|C2|1/2)
∑
w∈C2
|v +w〉. Note that v1 and v2 give the
same vector if v1−v2 ∈ C2. H1 is the parity check matrix
for the code C1 and H2 is that for C
⊥
2 , the dual of C2.
Qx,z is a class of QECCs. For v ∈ C1, the corresponding
code word is v → (1/|C2|1/2)
∑
w∈C2
(−1)z·w|x+ v + w〉.
II. THE QKD WITHOUT PUBLIC
ANNOUNCEMENT OF BASIS
It is notable that what we are considering in this sec-
tion is not security but reductions of the schemes.
Protocol A: Modified Lo-Chau scheme II.
(1) Alice creates 2n Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR)
pairs in the state |Φ+〉⊗2n. (2) Alice and Bob are as-
sumed to be sharing a prior random (2n/r)-bit string,
the basis sequence b. (2n/r is a positive integer.) Alice
performs the Hadamard transform on second half of each
EPR pair for which b is one. (3) Alice repeats the step 2
r times with the same basis sequence b. (4) Alice sends
the second half of each pair to Bob. (5) Bob receives
the qubits and publically announces this fact. (6) Bob
performs the Hadamard transform on second half of each
EPR pair for which b is one. (7) Bob repeats the step 6 r
times with the same basis sequence b. (8) Alice randomly
selects n of the 2n EPR pairs to serve as check bits to test
for Eve’s interference. Then she announces it to Bob. (9)
Alice and Bob each measure their halves of the n check
EPR pairs in the {|0〉, |1〉} basis and share the results.
If too many of these measurements disagree, they abort
the scheme. (10) Alice and Bob make the measurements
on their code qubits of σ
[r]
z for each row r ∈ H1 and σ[r]x
for each row r ∈ H2. Alice and Bob share the results,
compute the syndromes for bit and phase flips, and then
transforms their state so as to obtain m (encoded) nearly
EPR pairs. (11) Alice and Bob measure the EPR pairs in
the (encoded) {|0〉, |1〉} basis to obtain m-bit final string
with near-perfect security. ✷
The entanglement purification protocols with one-way
classical communcations are equivalent to the QECCs
[21]. The modified Lo-Chau protocol reduces to the CSS
codes protocol by this equivalence [17]. However, the
only difference between the Protocol A and the modified
Lo-Chau protocol is the following. In the former they use
the basis sequence b to determine whether they apply the
Hadamard operation or not, while in the latter they do
it by their own different random sequences and they use
only matched bases. We can see that the protocol A
reduces to the protocol B by the same equivalence.
Protocol B: CSS codes scheme II.
(1) Alice creates n random check bits and a random m-
bit key k. They are assumed to share a prior random
(2n/r)-bit string, the basis sequence b. (2) Alice chooses
n-bit strings x and z at random. (3) Alice encodes her
key |k〉 using the CSS code Qx,z. (4) Alice chooses n
positions out of 2n and puts the check bits in these po-
sitions and the code bits in the remaining positions. (6)
Alice performs the Hadamard transform on the qubits for
which b is one. (7) Alice repeats the step 6 r times with
the same basis sequence b. (8) Alice sends the resulting
state to Bob. Bob acknowledges the receipt of the qubits.
(9) Alice announces the positions of check bits, the val-
ues of the check bits, x, and z. (10) Bob performs the
Hadamard transform on the qubits for which the compo-
nent of b is one. (11) Bob repeats the step 10 r times with
the same basis sequence b. (12) Bob checks whether too
many of the check bits have been corrupted, and aborts
the scheme if so. (13) Bob measures the qubits in the
(encoded) {|0〉, |1〉} basis to obtain m-bit final key with
near-perfect security. ✷
The only difference between the Protocol B and the
CSS codes protocol [17] is the following. In the former
they use the basis sequence b to determine whether they
apply the Hadamard operation or not, while in the latter
they do it by their own different random sequences and
they use only matched cases. We can see that the pro-
tocol B reduces to the following protocol C in the same
way as the modified CSS codes protocol reduces to the
BB84 protocol.
Protocol C: QKD without public announcement of ba-
sis
(1) Alice creates 2n random bits. Alice and Bob are shar-
ing a prior random (2n/r)-bit string, the basis sequence
b. (2) Alice encodes each random bit to qubits using the
basis sequence b. That is, when the random bit is 0 (1)
and the corresponding component of the basis sequence
b is zero, she creates a qubit in the |0〉 (|1〉) state. When
the random bit is 0 (1) and the corresponding component
of the basis sequence b is one, she creates a qubit in the
|0¯〉 (|1¯〉) state. (3) Alice repeats the step 2 r times with
the same basis sequence b. (4) Alice sends the resulting
qubits to Bob. (5) Bob receives the 2n qubits and per-
forms measurement Sz or Sx if the corresponding compo-
nent of the sequence b is zero and one, respectively. Here
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Sz (Sx) is the orthogonal measurements whose eigenvec-
tors are |0〉 and |1〉 (|0¯〉 and |1¯〉). (6) Bob repeats the
step 5 r times with the same basis sequence b.(7) Alice
decides randomly on a set of n bits to use for the proto-
col. Then she announces it. The other n qubits are used
as check-bits. (8) Alice and Bob announce the values of
the their check-bits. If too few of these values agree, they
abort the protocol. (9) Alice announces u + v, where v
is a string consisting of randomly chosen code-bits, and
u is a random code word in C1. (10) Bob subtracts u+ v
from his code-bits, v + ǫ, and corrects the result, u + ǫ,
to a codeword in C1. (11) Alice and Bob use the coset
of each u+C2 as the key. In this way, they obtain m-bit
string. ✷
III. THE SECURITY OF THE QKD WITHOUT
PAB
Since we have shown the reduction of protocols A →
B → C, it is sufficient for us to show the security of
the protocol A here. Arguments in the following are for
entanglement purifications in the protocol A, thanks to
which we can deal with the coherent attacks.
We briefly remind the classicalization of statistics that
is stressed by Lo and Chau [18,25]. Then we will see that
remaining arguements are similar to what we used for the
individual attacks [23].
First, let us review the classicalization of statistics in
the Shor and Preskill proof [17]. What we consider is the
interaction of qubits |ψ〉 of Alice and Bob and quantum
probes |e〉 of Eve. In general, the state after any interac-
tion by a unitary operator U can be decomposed [26,27]
as
U |ψ〉|e〉 =
∑
{k}
C{k}σk1(1)σk2(2) · · · σkn(n)|ψ〉|e{k}〉. (1)
Here {k} is the abbreviation for the k1, k2, ..., kn with
ki = 0, 1, 2, 3 (i = 1, 2, ..., n), and σ0 = I, σ1 = σx,
σ2 = σy, σ3 = σz . The C{k}’s are coefficients. The vec-
tors |e{k}〉 are nomalized but not mutually orthogonal
in general. Since Eq. (1) is just the geneal decomposi-
tion of a vector by complete bases, it is clear that the
interaction described in Eq. (1) includes the case of the
coherent attacks as well as individual attacks. It is no-
table that Eve can make her quantum probes interact
with Alice and Bob’s qubits only when she has access
to their qubits. In other words, Eve cannot modifty the
interaction after the qubits left her. This is in contrast
with the fact that Eve can choose the measurement bases
even after the qubits left. Therefore we need not worry
about Eve’s later choice if our consideration is for the
interaction term Eq. (1). What Eve can do is only to
control the coefficients C{k}’s as she likes.
Let us note that the each state σk1(1)σk2(2) · · ·σkn(n)|ψ〉
is an eigenstate of the measurements that are performed
here. The qubits are initially prepared in the state |Φ+〉
that is one of the Bell states. The set of the Bell states
are closed for Pauli operations on a qubit. Thus each
qubit in the protocol that has undergone a certain Pauli
operation is one of the Bell states. On the other hand, the
measurements performed in the checking steps is equiva-
lent to the Bell measurements [17]. Therefore, as long as
the checking measurements are concerned, the state in a
mixed state
ρ =
∑
{k}
|C{k}|2σk1(1)σk2(2) · · · σkn(n)|ψ〉〈ψ|σk1(1)σk2(2)
· · ·σkn(n), (2)
gives rise to the same results as the pure state in Eq.
(1). This is the basis for the classicalization of statis-
tics [18,25], as a result of which it is sufficient for us
to consider classical distributions given by probabilities
P{k} = |C{k}|2 .
Once the classicalization of statistics is obtained, it is
not difficult to see that the modified Lo-Chau protocol II
is secure. In the case of the BB84 protocol, they estimate
the error rate, or the ratio of σ’s that are not identity
operator I among the σk1(1)σk2(2) ···σkn(n)’s, by doing the
checking measurement on some randomly chosen subsets
of the qubits. If Eve’s operation on a checked qubit is the
identity I, the probability to give rise to error is zero. If
Eve’s operation on a checked qubit is not the identity I,
it will give rise to errors probabilistically: If the basis
matches it will induce no error but if the bases do not
match it will. (More precisely, the probabilities to give
rise to errors is 1/2, 1/2, and 1, respectively, for σz , σx,
σy operations.) What Eve wants to do is to minimize the
number of errors in the check bits for a given number of
non-identity operations. However, since the checked bits
and the bases are randomly chosen by Alice and Bob,
Eve knows nothing about them while she has access to
the qubits of Alice and Bob. Thus we can assume that
the error rate of the checked bits represents that of the
code bits, that is a crucial point in the security proof.
Let us now consider the Protocol A. The Protocol A
to the first round is obviously stronger than the modi-
fied Lo-Chau protocol. Thus it is clear that to the first
round the Protocol A is as secure as the modified Lo-
Chau protocol. Let us consider the second round. Here
one may worry about that Eve can extract some informa-
tion about the basis sequence b after the first round. It
is obvious that if Eve knows the basis sequence b she
can successfully cheat. It is because in this case she
can control the probabilities P{k}’s so that more bases
are matched or the probability to be detected decreases.
However, no matter how many rounds are performed Eve
can extract no information on the basis sequence b by any
quantum operations in the ideal case [23]: The ensemble
of qubits with different bases give rise to the same den-
sity operators. (We will discuss the non-ideal case in the
next section. Also note that all public discussions be-
tween Alice and Bob are performed after all qubits have
arrived at Bob in the proposed protocol.) So we don’t
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have to worry about this point. Now what Eve knows is
that the same basis sequence b is used repeatedly. That
is, she knows which and which qubits are in the same ba-
sis although she does not know the identity of the basis.
Now the problem is that whether Eve can induce statis-
tically smaller number of errors in the checked bits for
a given number of non-identity operators in the second
round than in the first round. However, we can see that
she cannot do so because she does not know which basis
it is anyway and thus the probabiltity that the basis are
not matched is still 1/2. For example, let us consider
the first two qubits in the first and second round. If
Eve’s basis and the basis of checked bit is matched (not
matched) then the probability that it is to be detected is
zero (non-zero). Even if Eve knows that the two qubits
are in the same basis, that information is not helpful in
decreasing the expected error rate since the probabiltity
that the basis are not matched is still 1/2. Eve’s best
strategy here is to choose the same operations for the
two qubits. Then although the average error rate is not
changed, the deviation of the probabilistic distribution
will be increased. (We will discuss about the problem of
the large deviation in the next section.) We can easily
see that the same argument applies to remaining qubits
and all qubits in the later j-th rounds (j = 3, 4, 5, ..., r).
Therefore we can safely estimate the error rate in the
code bits based on that in the checked bits, as we did in
the modified Lo-Chau protocol [17].
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Let us consider the problem of the imperfect sources.
As noted in the previous section, the following fact is
crucial for the QKD without PAB. The two ensemble of
states, that is, the equal mixture of the |0〉 and |1〉 and
that of the |0¯〉 and |1¯〉 are equivalent to each other and
thus cannot be distinguished in any case. This is valid
when the sources are ideal. However, there must be a
certain amount of imperfection in the source. In this
case some amount of information on the basis sequence
b can be leaked to Eve, making the scheme insecure [28].
However, we give a practical method to overcome this
problem. It is not difficult to generate pairs of qubits in
one of the (imperfect) Bell state, for example, the |Φ+〉
state, with current technologies [12]. Alice can gener-
ate the qubits to be sent to Bob in the following way.
First she prepares pairs of qubits in the (imperfect) |Φ+〉
state and she performs either the measurement Sz or Sx
on one qubit of each pair. Here Sz (Sx) is the orthogo-
nal measurements whose eigenvectors are |0〉 and |1〉 (|0¯〉
and |1¯〉). She sends the other unmeasured qubits to Bob.
Bob’s ensemble of qubits generated by Sz (Sx) is a mix-
ture of imperfect |0〉 or |1〉 (either |0¯〉 or |1¯〉). However,
these two ensembles cannot be distinguished in princi-
ple. It is because Alice’s different choice of measurement
cannot change the density operator of Bob’s ensemble.
Thus at least the problem of leakage of the information
about the basis sequence b can be overcome. However,
this does not mean that the QKD without PAB with
imperfect source is secure. This problem is beyond the
scope of this paper. The Shor-Preskill paper [17] shows
the security with perfect sources only. The security with
imperfect source has been dealt with recently [29].
Next, let us compare the efficient QKD [22] with the
QKD without PAB. In the former, they obtain the ef-
ficiency ǫ2 + (1 − ǫ)2 for a given 0 < ǫ ≤ 1/2. The
number of check bits in the other basis is proportional to
ǫ2. Thus, when ǫ is small, namely when the efficiency is
nearly full, the former would have the problem of small
number of samples for data analysis. In order to obtain
enough security, therefore, they have to distribute a large
number of qubits at once. In the latter we have a similar
problem in a different way, as we noted in the previous
section. That is, if Eve had chosen the same operation
for the qubits with the same bases, the deviation in the
probabilistic distribution of the error rate of the checked
bits would be larger than that of the BB84 protocol, for
a given number of total data, n. However, the random
sampling process to estimate the error rate in the first
round with n/r bits will be at least as good as that of
the BB84 protocol with the same n/r bits. That is, the
error rate deviation of the QKD without PAB with r
rounds of n/r bits will be at least as small as that of the
BB84 protocol with n/r bits. (We can see that the former
is strictly smaller than the latter.) Therefore, provided
that the length n/r of the basis sequence is long enough
we can say that the proposed protocol is secure.
If the error rate in the checked bits is too high because
of noise on the communication line or because of Eve,
the protocol is aborted. One may worry about that some
information about the basis sequence has leaked to Eve
in this case. If Alice use again the random bits to be
encoded (in step (1) of the Protocol C) with the same
basis sequence b, it amounts to that the qubits in the
same state are repeatedly used. Then it is simple for Eve
to get information about the basis sequence. However,
if the random bits are newly generated everytime, the
two ensembles of qubits corresponding to different bases
have the same density operator I and thus they cannot be
distinguished, as we have discussed. Therefore, as long
as Alice uses the ramdom bits to be encoded only once,
they don’t have to discard the basis sequence b even after
the protocol had been aborted because of high error rate.
However, it should also be underlined [23] that the
basis sequence has to be discarded after the final key
is used for encrypting a message, because a ciphertext
gives partial information about the key by which it is
encrypted. The information about the key can then used
to extract information about the basis sequence b.
In conclusion, we have given a Shor-Preskill type
security-proof to the quantum key distribution scheme
without public announcement of basis [23]. We have
given the modified Lo-Chau protocol II. This scheme re-
duces to the CSS codes scheme II that reduces to the
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QKD without PAB. We have reviewed how the classi-
cality is obtained in the Shor-Preskill type proof. Using
the classicality we argued how we can estimate the er-
ror rate in the code bits based on that in the checked
bits in the modified Lo-Chau protocol II. Since remain-
ing arguments are the same, this completes the proof.
We discussed the problem of imperfect source and that
of necessity of generation of a large number of data. We
discussed when the bases sequence must be discarded.
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